Guest blogger at Democracy Arsenal, Ali Eteraz has attempted to wade in to the progressive foreign policy debate by throwing a hand-grenade at the so-called "ultra left". His contention: progressive politics can be divided in to the isolationist left and the Truman Democrats, where the latter should come to prominence. Here’s a quote:
Today's Isolationist Leftist shares almost nothing with a Truman Democrat in terms of foreign policy. Here are the six foreign policy "principles" that define a Truman Democrat: American exceptionalism, the use of force, American hegemony, the world community, liberal-mindedness, and helping the least well off. Today's Isolationist Left rejects the first three of those without a thought (because they are presumed to be solely belonging to the Neo-Cons). The other three are accepted as long as they do not require having to affirm any of the first three principles.
Clearly this is a disappointing false dichotomy. By conjuring a nonsense position out of thin air to contrast with his own, Mr Eteraz just echoes the silly framing used by the right since Vietnam, and most recently through the whole Iraq debacle.
Trying to paint mainline progressives as being divided in to enlightened exceptionalists, on one hand, and the loony isolationist left, on the other, is wrongheaded. What's more, it's obviously so, given the substantive support that existed for the war in Afghanistan, as a legitimate action under the collective security regime compared to Iraq. Indeed, as I've previously explained, the Pell Global Attitudes survey demonstrates that this division is a worldwide phenomenon.
In response to a suggestion that perhaps interventionism versus anti-interventionism would be a better terminological distinction than 'isolationism', Mr Eteraz responded:
The majority of the replies have argued that my dichotomy between "Isolationist Leftist" and "Truman Democrat" is false. They prefer to be referred to as "anti-interventionists." Their assumption is that since the word "anti-intervention" is not as insular sounding as "isolationist" they can't be accused of being self-obsessed Americans. This is an altogether meaningless game of semantics. Why? Because there is no such thing as a pure anti-interventionist. Even Kossacks have a favorite intervention: Darfur (these are the 432,00 results when you type "Darfur Daily Kos" into Google). So, very quickly it is established that in this global world, every American is an interventionist.
Whilst this is a fair observation, Mr Eteraz makes it by dodging all the other criticisms, failing to notice he has contradicted himself in the process. I would agree that anti-interventionism is something of a misnomer, given that there are plenty of contrary beliefs - like an enthusiasm for intervention in Dafur. However, it must be noted that by disproving the replacement terminology, Mr Eteraz simply begs the question of why ‘isolationism’ was ever going to be a defensible description of the less militarily assertive side within progressive politics? We then return to the question of why exactly he used a caricatured Chamberlain strawman in the first place? If it is so obvious that there is no such thing as an anti-interventionist camp, then it is scarcely credible that a more extreme label like isolationism ever had any merit.
Note: leftists are not just pro-intervention in Dafur, they are also often enamoured with the idea of world government, interdependence theory, and the creation of bodies like a UN rapid reaction forces for humanitarian crisis, etc., so isolationism is even more discordant than anti-interventionism as a label.
Mr Eteraz continues his follow up post, by trying to defend his use of exceptionalism. He states:
Point is: the ultra-Left needs to take a breather each time they see the word "exceptionalism" and "hegemony" because they will often find that not everyone is out to use these principles in a way that Bush used them in Iraq.
Whilst I take the point that not everyone uses the word exceptionalism to mean the same thing in foreign policy, I do find it perplexing that Mr Eteraz thinks it is a term worth rehabilitating from the neo-conservative connotations which indelibly stain the word in current parlance. So let’s be clear here, there are two meanings of the term and it seems Mr Eteraz has not been particularly careful in distancing himself from neo-conservative definition, which is vulnerable to attack. Let me explain...
1. The first usage of the term is commonly employed in the phrase ‘American exceptionalism.’ This exceptionalism derives from the sense of America being being unique and excellent, rather than the idea of asymmetry. It is also tied to the myth of the nation idea, as well as a kind of ode to the democratic and entrepreneurial spirit of America. It is an attempt to capture such facets of the American political experience as its rather unique modern religiosity compared to Europe, its role in advancing the democratic frontier, and the general free-thinking confidence of its public aspirations. In my opinion, this usage of the term should really be seen as de Tocquevillean American exceptionalism.
This view is not strictly to do with foreign policy, but it certainly colours many beliefs about the nature of American power, and its relative status as a world leader and hegemon. It is also not as contested as Mr Eteraz thinks it is on the Anglo-American left. Whilst I would imagine many, including myself, would regard as absurd any history of American power which relied on an almost Hegelian meta-narrative of benign progress, as you sometimes find on the right, I don’t think that many people dispute that as "Empire," America is better than most feasible alternatives. I would also point out that even fierce leftist critics, like Noam Chomsky, for example, are on the record as agreeing that the US is great overall, and that the American public, when acting on their best instincts, have done a lot of good in the world. From this, it is pretty obvious that de Tocquevillean American exceptionalism is not a real fault line in progressive foreign policy.
2. It is the other kind usage of the word, however, which provides connotations of which Mr Eteraz appears oblivious. This is the belief that the US approach to the rule of law and international relations should unashamedly pursue US primacy at all costs. This is the view that the normalising, uncertainty-reducing, and values-promoting effect of international law do not create any national interest in exporting and maintaining a robust, and adherence generating, system of international norms. This is the kind of exceptionalism which is diametrically opposed to the legacy of FDR and Truman, and indeed, the bipartisan Atlantic Charter consensus that arguably existed until GWB himself.
This exceptionalism is most associated with the pugnacious attitude of former Senator Jesse Helms, and the strident position taken by influential neo-conservatives, and their allies, with regard to international institutions, and the collective security regime. Their view is that there is no real cost for the United States in acting unilaterally, and without regard to weakening the background system of norms which make others cooperate. To them, norms don’t really matter, except as a rhetorical framework in domestic politics, and as background unexamined beliefs about the inherent virtue of America as an actor. Nothing is sacred as long as it is in the service of managed US hegemony. In this manner, they hold one set of rules for everyone else, and no rules for themselves – hence the US is an 'exceptional actor.'
This view, as I hope most people realise, (and the recent WPO poll gives me some hope), is incoherent, unsustainable and has no redeeming qualities whatsoever. It is thus very troubling when a nominal progressive identifies exceptionalism as a core component of their beliefs. For if they mean the latter definition I have given, we are in serious trouble. As I have already argued, invoking Truman in support of the view would just add insult to injury. It is also worth pointing out here, that Anne Marie Slaughter does NOT support exceptional as Mr Eteraz may be claiming under the latter definition. Nor does Robert Keohane, for the matter, or anyone else doing serious work in international relations these days like Samatha Power. Indeed, for all that the Princeton National Security Project may be uncomfortably hawkish for some on the left, the whole point is that it at least attempts to create a systematisation of its hawkish sensibilities. At least theoretically it is capable of universalisation within the system, or within the so-called Concert of Democracies.
This feature of symmetry or formal equality is important in a fundamental way besides the practical benefits of baseline legal cooperation. Universalisability itself is a basic criterion of any credible normative system, and it is something that the neo-conservative approach, by its very nature, cannot ever achieve. There's a good reason there won't ever be anything equivalent to James Steinburg's discussion paper on the preventative use of force coming out of the neo-conservative camp. The reason is that the exceptionalism of neo-conservatives, by definition, precludes them offering reciprocity even to formal equals. For example, they would never extend to China, or any other power, the same courtesy that was assumed by themselves in Iraq. No other nation would be allowed the kind geopolitical space to make a war of choice on the basis of exaggeration and guff under the cover of non-proliferation. Not on the basis of a geopolitical concerns, force projection, or a naked doctrine of dominance like the Bush NSSs.
Iraq is potent example of this, when you consider that, of course, there is no universal permission to act on self-proclaimed power to interpret and enforce Security Council resolutions unilaterally. The US would certainly not countenance other nations, even allies, trying to argue that they had authority to self-execute war based on resolutions carrying interpretations that were explicitly rejected in the UNSC.
This hypocrisy is at the heart of the sometimes poorly articulated case against the war, and that is why it is troubling to see someone apparently tone deaf to why its usage might be a landmine of raging bloggers.
The most galling thing about it is that, though we know hear it as a post-hoc justification, humanitarian intervention has been tarred. Without even putting a meagre effort to put in place to establish a working framework for humanitarian intervention,the Administration effectively soured many Americans away from being constructively and engaged in the world.
Just on the side, I think it is rather serendipitous timing that Mr Eteraz's comments happen to coincide with Kofi Annan’s recent speech at the Truman Presidential Library. I suggest everyone reads Mr Annan's remarks, and especially the parts where he quotes Harry Truman himself, as they offer a reminder of just how far off the page Mr Eteraz is, if he does in fact think the Truman legacy is coupled with foreign policy exceptionalism.So, if Mr Eteraz means the first definition, it is not going to do the work of differentiation that he apparently wants to separate himself from the supposed views of the 'ultra left'. It is also puzzling why he would start assuming that the left was opposed to this exceptionalism, if all he meant was the de Tocquevillean sense.
Regardless, in my opinion, any idea of forming a progressive foreign policy movement which displaces the most pacifist fringe, needs to start with a more concrete understanding of how liberal interventionism is different from neo-conservativism, other than just practical matters of disagreement over the implementation of the war in Iraq. For a start, he should look at the existing literature, and the real positions taken by scholars and internationalists on the progressive side. There he could find an assertive, but universalisable foreign policy. In order to fully grasp the idea of working within the system, rather than working against it, he need only look at humanitarian intervention as advocated within the rubric of erga omnes, principles of nascent jus cogens against terrorism, and reform of the collective security regime. Importantly, such research would have explanatory power for why the world had little problem with Afghanistan, but found Iraq to be abhorrent. After all, that is the defining difference of our times in foreign policy, and nothing in Mr Eteraz’s piece gives much indication that he understands the importance of the distinction. For too long, those of his ilk have tried to sweep Iraq under the table as some kind of gentlemen's disagreement, which just provides cover for idiots like Joe Lieberman in the process.
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